




















When on July 24, 2000, the Dutch UMTS auction suddenly
ended in turmoil – and with revenues of less than 2.65 billion
euro, while the Minister of Finance had previously announced
revenues on the order of 10 billion euro – the entire country
was up in arms. The responsible ministers were called to par-
liament to explain what had gone wrong and, apparently not
being completely satisfied, the parliament decided to start an
official, independent investigation of the entire process by
which licenses were awarded, and of the role of the govern-
ment, in particular. The goal of the investigation is to provide
information on the motivation for using an auction, on the
process leading to the specific auction format chosen, and on
the auction process – and it has to provide an international
perspective. This summer, OCFEB, the Rotterdam-based insti-
tution that won the contract to perform the investigation, will
publish its results. Now that things have calmed down, many
other European countries have also awarded 3G licenses (and
stock prices of European telecommunications firms have
plummeted to one-third or less of their values from before the
auctions), it is a proper time to look back. What can the
OCFEB investigation be expected to reveal? What, if anything,
has gone wrong? What lessons can be drawn for the future?
Revenues in Europe
As far as complaints about Dutch revenues are concerned, table 1
provides a sobering picture. The table gives revenues (expressed
in euro per member of the population) for all of the Western
European countries that have allocated their licenses up to now
(the countries are listed according to the time at which they
awarded the licenses). The clear message is that the Minister of
Finance did not do very poorly: he just misses the rostrum!
Furthermore, the only reason why Italy “scores” higher than the
Netherlands is that it used an instrument, a relatively high mini-
mum price, which apparently could not be used in the
Netherlands. I don’t know whether imposing a positive minimum
price was impossible here, but I do know that, at present, parlia-
ment is discussing a change in the law that would make it possi-
ble.
Table 1 prompts two questions. What explains the large variability
in revenues obtained, and how important are (large) revenues?
Concerning the first question, an important explanatory variable
is the allocation mechanism that was used. Finland, Spain,
Sweden and Norway all used a “beauty contest” (in which the gov-
ernment awards licenses to the parties presenting the best busi-
ness plans), requiring only marginal fees to be paid. Clearly this
mechanism will not produce high revenue. Upon seeing the
higher revenues in other countries, Spain has indicated that it
regrets that choice, and it is trying to increase the fees now – a
move that is being fought by the winners with all the legal means
at their disposal. France decided to use a fixed price mechanism:
all parties that were willing to pay 4.95 euro bln. could enter a
beauty contest for four licenses. It turned out that only two parties
were willing to pay that price, which explains the smaller rev-
enues in France. All other countries used variations of the simul-
taneous multi-round ascending auction. While there were sub-
stantial differences in the details of the rules, which certainly
could have an influence on final prices, we will not discuss those
aspects here (see Klemperer (2000), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001)
and Van Damme (2001)). Similarly, the number of licenses dif-
fered in the different countries, as well as the market conditions
and the rights associated with the licenses. All these factors might
influence the final price, but space limitations require us to con-
fine ourselves to a few remarks.
Competition was fierce in Germany and the UK, resulting in
high prices there. In Italy, the auction only lasted 11 rounds and
the revenue was high – purely attributable to the high minimum
price. The timing of the auction is an important determinant for
the revenue generated. Instructive is the case of Belgium, a coun-
try that entered very late in the race. Even though it had a rela-
tively low minimum price, only the three incumbent 2G operators
were willing to pay it; hence, one license is left unsold. In con-
trast, the UK was first. It auctioned, in effect, not only UK
licenses, but options to create European networks, and this option
value may, in part, explain the higher prices there. In my view, the
high prices in Germany resulted from the battle (mainly between
KPN and Telefonica) as to which party would become the 4
th or 5
th * CentER, Tilburg University26
mobile operator in Europe. KPN lost this battle, and this induced
Hutchinson to part from KPN. As a consequence of losing, KPN
is in a weaker position when negotiating a merger with Telefonica
and/or TIM. Returning to the government perspective, we note
that the Dutch revenues could have been higher if the govern-
ment had delayed less in preparing the auction and would have
implemented the original plan of auctioning before the UK.
However, how important are large revenues, really?
The goal: efficiency or revenue?
In the evaluation of the auction that the cabinet sent to parliament
on September 4, 2000, one reads “In het algemeen verdient het
veilinginstrument de voorkeur (...) omdat het economisch effi-
ciënt is en een optimale opbrengst oplevert”,
1 a quote that sug-
gests that there is no conflict between efficiency and revenue.
There is some support for this view in the literature; after all,
there is the “revenue equivalence theorem,” which states that,
given certain conditions, all efficient auctions that give zero utility
to the lowest type, generate the same expected utility for all play-
ers involved, including the seller. Furthermore, we know from
auction theory that (again given certain assumptions) all standard
auction forms produce an efficient outcome.
2 However, one
important assumption underlying these theorems is symmetry,
and exactly this assumption is violated when allocating 3G
licenses. After all, there are incumbents (those that already have a
2G license, a network and customers) and newcomers. Second,
the standard framework expresses efficiency in terms of the bid-
ders, but obviously an allocation that maximises the revenues for
the telecom firms need not maximise total welfare or consumer
surplus. For these reasons the standard auction model does not
apply when allocating 3G licenses, and there may well be a con-
flict between efficiency and revenue. Consequently, the govern-
ment needs to think about which objective it wants to pursue and
what instrument it wants to use to obtain that objective.
A reading of the parliamentary texts with respect to auctions
and telecommunications policy shows that the Dutch objectives
are vaguely described (“creating a competitive and innovating
market”), and that a broad class of instruments (“the use of the
market mechanism”) is allowed. One thing, at least, is clear: rev-
enue generation has not been an official objective; indeed, the
cabinet has claimed, and parliament has accepted, that revenue
generation will not and should not be an objective. In retrospect,
it is strange, and to the discredit of Dutch economists, that this
objective was accepted without there being much debate about
what exactly the objective should be. To be sure, a competitive
telecommunications market contributes to the overall Dutch wel-
fare, but so might a high auction revenue. An auction price, after
all, is a sunk cost without distortions (contrasted to regular taxa-
tion). Hence, auction revenues might be used to reduce other
taxes and might contribute to higher welfare in this way. In this
year’s Central Economic Plan CPB mentions the cost of public
funds and the need to generate public funds as cheaply as possi-
ble.
3 Certainly, this is a discussion that has to be continued in the
future; the UMTS auction was an expensive occasion to learn this
lesson.
Efficiency and asymmetry
In his seminal auction paper, William Vickrey already showed
that, when players are in asymmetric positions, a standard auc-
tion need not necessarily produce an efficient outcome—and the
first and second price auctions need not generate the same rev-
enue. Gilbert and Newbery (1988) have stressed that differences
between incumbents and entrants pose special problems for auc-
tions. The intuition is easily conveyed. Consider a monopolistic
market, and suppose a second license is auctioned. The value to
the license of the incumbent monopolist is his future monopoly















































profit; the value to an entrant is the profit that he can obtain when
competing with the monopolist. As the latter is smaller than the
former in an ordinary ascending auction, the monopolist will win
the second license, the monopoly will remain and the benefits of
competition will not be realised. Furthermore, the higher the
potential benefits of competition, the lower the value to the
entrant, and hence, the lower the auction price. In this situation,
if the government really wants to act in the public interest, it must
discriminate against the monopolist: if the playing field is not
level, the rules of the game must favour the weaker players in
order to create an interesting game.
A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation may provide an
indication about how large the value differences between incum-
bents and entrants are in the context of 3G licenses. Assume, for
example, that the ARPU (average 3G revenues per subscriber) is
40 euro per month, and that the discount rate (WACC) is 1% per
month. If it thus takes two years to roll out the network before rev-
enue starts to flow in, then total discounted revenue is about 3000
euro per subscriber. If one counts on 6 million subscribers, each
with a market share, then one arrives at expected revenue of 6 bln
euro. From this, one has to subtract the cost of actually building
and maintaining the network (say 1 bln euro) in order to get to the
value of 5 bln euro. The value is lower for an entrant, as he can
expect only a smaller market share, can start later and has higher
costs for constructing the network. Fortis Bank estimates network
costs for an entrant to be one-third higher. Then, assuming an
expected market share of 10% (which is on the high side), one can
calculate the value to be 0.5 bln euro. One notices how large the
difference is: it is an order of magnitude less! One might well
question why there were any entrants at all participating in the
Dutch auction – an issue that we discuss below.
In another context, the Dutch government seemed to have
gained the insight that one has to bias the playing field in order to
correct for asymmetries between firms. The original proposals in
the “MDW-project Benzinemarkt” for auctioning licenses for
gasoline stations involved an asymmetric auction. However,
under pressure of incumbent oil companies, the government
quickly backed down, apparently because the European
Commission considered asymmetric auctions to be discrimina-
tory, and involving state aid. It can be easily shown, however, that
this criticism does not apply. A third lesson, hence, is that we
should study in greater detail the possibility of using asymmetric
auctions.
Lobbies and rules
Economic theory distinguishes two theories of regulation.
According to the public interest theory, regulation is supplied by
the government to correct for market failures. The private interest
theory holds that incumbents demand regulation in order to pro-
tect them against entrants. The equilibrium on this market deter-
mines the actual regulations. The appendix to background docu-
ment “Procesbeschrijving UMTS,” mentioned in footnote 1, gives
detailed insights of how this market worked in this special case. A
summary can easily be given. Based on recommendations of the
UMTS forum (an international lobby group of telecommunica-
tions firms), the Dutch government proposed the auctioning of
four (large) licenses. As this would eliminate one existing player
from the market, it is understandable that this proposal was not
greeted with great enthusiasm by all. Furthermore, NMa and
OPTA were not happy with the prospect of a rather concentrated
market. The discussion moved on to whether five or six licenses
should be offered. Some incumbents lobbied for six, presumably
based on the idea that a larger supply implies a lower price. The
better economists, or at least the more experienced ones, were to
be found with KPN. They had participated in the preparations and
discussion in the UK, and had learned from the experience there
that a situation with as many licenses as incumbents was highly
unfavourable for newcomers (and, hence, most desirable for
incumbents). Consequently, KPN lobbied for five, and got its way.
Interesting is the fact that the UK discussions about the prob-
lems associated with a 4-to-4 scenario (4 incumbents, 4 licenses)
had taken place almost a year before the Dutch came to discuss the
5-to-5 scenario (which presents equal difficulties). While the UK
government and its (academic) advisors had thought long and
hard about the problem and had found an ingenious way out (the
Anglo-Dutch auction), the Dutch government officials during the
preparatory process never showed any awareness of this problem.
As a result, the outcome of the lobby game was highly favourable
for the Dutch telecommunications incumbents. The lesson to be
learned here is that if the government does not want to be putty in
the hands of the vested interests, then it should surround itself
with strong, qualified independent advisors. The saying “penny
wise, pound foolish” seems to apply in this case.
4
Versatel
Given that the Dutch government decided to auction 5 3G
















neous auction (given that such an auction format guarantees that
the parties with the highest valuations will win the licenses), why
did any entrant take the trouble to participate in the Dutch auc-
tion? Why did the auction take place at all? Why wasn’t the govern-
ment forced to give the licenses to the incumbents for free? These
are the questions that the government should have been thinking
about before the auction. All signs, however, indicate that the gov-
ernment was thinking about exactly the opposite “problem” of
how to prevent too high a price (Bennett and Canoy, 2000), even
though some academics had tried to push the government in the
right direction. (Maasland, 2000)
In the end, there was only one non-incumbent that partici-
pated in the auction, Versatel, and fortunately we know why it par-
ticipated: it had openly displayed its motives on its web-site the
day before the auction started.
“We would however not like to see that we end up with nothing whilst
other players get their licenses for free. Versatel invites the incumbent
mobile operators to immediately start negotiations for access to their
existing 2G networks as well as entry to the 3G market either as a part
owner of a license or as a mobile virtual network operator.”
5
The message was clear: Versatel was willing to share a
license, provided that the terms were right and that access to the
existing 2G networks was offered on reasonable terms.
Incumbents could expect (or might induce) Versatel to drop out of
the auction if an agreement could be reached. On the other hand,
Versatel clearly realised that it had bargaining power over the
incumbents: by staying in the auction for longer it would raise the
price that the incumbents would have to pay. I note that Versatel
was well aware of the fact that, under normal conditions, it could
not win a license. The arguments are given in the formal legal
complaints that Versatel issued both in the Netherlands and at the
EU-level. Hence, Versatel participated not to win a license, but
rather to get concessions from the incumbents. Note, however,
the free-rider problem on the part of the incumbents: all of them
would benefit when Versatel dropped out, but only one party had
to come to an agreement.
The auction
We now know that Telfort accepted the invitation of Versatel. On
July 6, the day the auction started, talks took place between repre-
sentatives of these companies. Telfort voluntarily revealed this
information during a hearing at the Ministry on November 1,
2000. Two days later, on November 3, the Dutch competition
authority, the NMa, raided the offices of both companies. A large
collection of documents were confiscated, but in the end the com-
petition authority concluded that no evidence was found that
these had as aim or effect any influence on competition in the
auction. Hence, there was no proof of violation of the competition
act, case closed. In other words, even if the case had a strange
odour, it is still not clear that it was rotten. What is surprising is
that, apparently, the competition authority had not closely moni-
tored the auction process; it became active only four months after
the event. Clearly, finding evidence after such a long time is diffi-
cult. Given the small number of bidders, the high stakes involved,
and the press release of Versatel, the NMa should have monitored
the game much more closely. I think the NMa has learned an
important lesson.
There is another lesson to be learned as well. Indeed, it is not
clear that the behaviour of Telfort and Versatel is a violation of the
competition law. To be concrete, suppose Telfort would have made
the following proposal to Versatel “I offer you the possibility of
becoming an MVNO on my network, as well as access to my 2G
network (on certain conditions), provided that the price I pay for
my license is not more than 0.1 mln euro”. Suppose Versatel
decides not to participate in the auction; prices drop to zero and
Versatel accepts Telfort’s offer. Is this collusion? I don’t think so,
but then, I am not a lawyer. What the example shows is that the
competition law is not sufficiently powerful to prevent all behav-
iour that one might consider anti-competitive, or undesirable. If
one wants to prevent such behaviour, then one must proceed by
changing the auction rules. It is at this point that the auction rules
were especially weak; they provided almost no possibility of
excluding players from the auction in the case of anti-competitive
behaviour. In any case, players suspected of such behaviour had to
first be given warnings by the state, who obviously would be reluc-
tant to issue such warnings, as eliminating players would reduce
revenue. The lesson for the government is that it should commit
itself by writing stronger penalty clauses in the auction regulation.
A good example is provided by the Italian rules – rules that, had
they been applied in the Dutch auction, would have prevented
some other types of undesirable behaviour, as well.
For the most part, the Dutch auction was uneventful. An
exception has to be made for the beginning and the end of the
















minimum, the government made rules specifying that players
could use “pass cards” at the beginning of the auction and that, on
lots receiving no bids, the minimum price would be (stepwise)
reduced to zero. All players, apart from Libertel, realised that it
was sensible (a dominant strategy?) to use these pass cards
instead of starting to bid immediately and to drive prices to zero
first. In effect, the players were in a kind of prisoners’ dilemma;
the only effect was that the auction lasted a week longer than it
would otherwise have. (Of course this also gave some parties
more time to come to an agreement.)
The end of the auction was more surprising. On Friday, 
July 21, in round 297, Versatel outbid Telfort on lot D with a bid of
862 million euro, after which Telfort’s lawyers sent a confidential
letter to Versatel stating that Versatel’s bidding served only to raise
the price; that such behaviour constituted a tort towards Telfort
and that Telfort would hold Versatel and its managers liable for all
damages resulting from this action. Versatel interpreted the mes-
sage as a threat, and indicated to Telfort and to the auctioneer that
it would no longer bid. Neither the auctioneer, nor the govern-
ment, informed the other parties of the fact that Versatel with-
drew from the bidding. Hence, on Monday, July 24, when still six
rounds were played before Versatel had to move again (and then
would quit), Telfort was able to profit from insider information.
Indeed, Telfort’s bid on lot B in round 301 that day could be inter-
preted as an attempt to profit from the additional piece of infor-
mation. Obviously, then, bidding behaviour was distorted on the
last day. The auctioneer should have suspended the auction, and
should have created a level playing field (as far as information is
concerned). It is still very surprising that this particular course of
action was not taken. Apparently, the auctioneer and the govern-
ment were not prepared to deal with this contingency. Market par-
ties suffered considerably from this: on Monday, final total rev-
enue was 857 million euro (22%) higher than it was on Friday at
the end of the day. There is an important lesson to be drawn here,
and the OCFEB investigation could clarify just exactly what went
wrong on the side of the government that Monday morning.
The aftermath
There was a lot of turmoil immediately after the auction, caused
by the revenue, which was considered to be disappointingly low 
at the time, and the chaotic events at the end of the auction.
Furthermore, members of parliament, who had initially stated
that revenues should not be a goal, complained about the low 
revenue.
6 Much to the credit of the responsible Ministry, it pub-
lished an evaluation already at the beginning of September,
accompanied by detailed information about the process leading to
the auction and about the auction itself. At that time, the main
conclusions could already be drawn, and indeed they had already
been drawn in articles in ESB and Het Financieele Dagblad by the
author
7 and others such as Boot and Van Wijnbergen. In this
respect, it is somewhat disappointing that parliament did not
reach conclusions quickly, and instead decided to delay and to
start another investigation. With almost all relevant information
already being public, there is not much to investigate, and few
surprises can be expected in the OCFEB report.
However, we can now benefit from making the international
comparison. We see that competition for licenses was intense
only in the UK and in Germany. Competition was fierce in the UK
because of the “option principle” mentioned above. Also, at that
time, companies had not yet learned how expensive competition
was, and hence, how attractive it was to cooperate. The market
learned quickly, and the pace of consolidation was fast. For exam-
ple, rather than to compete with Ben in the Dutch market, DT
found it more attractive to take over that company. It is notewor-
thy that in almost all countries that auctioned later than the
Netherlands there were some problems, with noticeable attempts
to collude in Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Italy.
Furthermore, in many of these countries (including Germany),
the auction design received the criticism of academics. The lesson
learned here is that auction design is an art in itself, and its com-
plexity should not be underestimated.
The main lesson
It is perhaps this last lesson that still seems least appreciated in the
Netherlands, and one hopes that it will be stressed in the OCFEB
report. Just as constructing physical infrastructure is professional
work that takes time, so is market engineering and the construc-
tion of proper auction rules to obtain desirable outcomes. The lat-
ter, however, does not yet seem to be appreciated in the
Netherlands, as the recent experience with the planned auction of
frequencies for commercial radio stations has clearly shown. This
case shows how powerful the lobbies of vested interests can be and
how easy it is to influence the Dutch parliament. The Wagenaar
motion, which was unanimously accepted by the second chamber
of parliament, instructed the government to investigate possibili-
















positions. This demand was clearly against the public interest, and
is something every inhabitant of the Netherlands should be
ashamed of. The cabinet gave in to the demand, and the Bouw
committee was given a couple of weeks to come up with another
design. This time period, however, was much too short to arrive at
a well-thought out design, and indeed, the Bouw proposal is
incomplete and suffers from severe shortcomings. Even though
markets crash in other ways than bridges and tunnels do, and such
crashes are not always visible to the public, markets do sometimes
crash. Some things simply cannot be done.
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Parental leave
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Abstract
Most parental leave arrangements in the Netherlands 
currently only provide for unpaid leave. An economy-wide
introduction of paid parental leave will encourage parents with
young children to combine labour market participation with
care for children. This article considers the trend in parental
leave programmes and the long-run consequences of paid
parental leave on the economy. The simulations show that
both the labour supply in hours of eligible parents and other
workers falls. The fall in formal production dominates the rise
in informal production. Despite these costs, paid leave might
be considered an attractive policy option for various reasons.
First, it may alleviate borrowing constraints for young parents.
Second, paid leave may achieve a more equal distribution of
work and informal care between men and women with young
children. Furthermore, paid leave makes parental leave more
accessible to low-income workers.
Introduction
The Work & Care Act (WCA) is expected to come into effect in
2002. This Act unites current leave schemes – such as maternity,
paternity, adoption and parental leave – and adds some new pro-
grammes, like a short-term leave option to take care of family
members that have fallen ill.
Under the WCA, working parents are entitled to three
months of unpaid parental leave per child. To stimulate the social
partners to make arrangements for paid parental leave, the 
government recently introduced a tax cut for employers offering
paid parental leave to their employees. If this measure doesn’t
result in a significant rise in the number of employees using paid
leave, then the government will consider the introduction of a
legal right to paid parental leave.
The government considers paid parental leave important
because it makes it easier for men and women to combine work
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